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We examine how direct to consumer advertising (DCA) affects the delay between 
diagnosis and pharmacological treatment for patients suffering from a common chronic disease.  
The primary data for this study consist of patients diagnosed with osteoarthritis (N=18,235) 
taken from a geographically diverse national research network of 72 primary care practices with 
348 physicians in 27 states over the 1999 to 2002 time period. Brand specific advertising data 
was collected for local and network television at the monthly-level for the nearest media markets 
to the practices.   Results of duration models of delay to treatment suggest advertising does affect 
the length of time that patients and physicians wait to initiate therapy.  This evidence suggests 
these effects may be welfare enhancing, in that advertising tends to encourage more rapid 
adoption among patients who are good clinical candidates for the therapy, and leads to less rapid 
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In August of 1997 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relaxed the rules governing 
television advertising of prescription pharmaceutical products.  Before that time, broadcast ads 
were permitted only to mention either the name of a drug, or a disease against which a drug was 
effective, but not both.  After August of 1997, pharmaceuticals were allowed to mention both the 
disease and drug brand name (as long as a brief list of side effects was mentioned and a 1-800 
number or World Wide Web site was provided with more detailed information).  Spending for 
DTCA for prescription drugs went from $596 million in 1995 to approximately $1.2 billion in 
1997 (T. Nordenberg, 1988) , to $2.5 billion by 2000 (Management NIFHC, 2001), and finally to 
$3.8 billion for 2004.(Stuart Elliott, 2004)  This has lead to a great deal of debate in the medical 
profession and among health care insurers and managed care organizations, and an ongoing 
review of advertising rules by the FDA.  However, very little is actually known about the effects 
of DTCA for the efficient allocation of prescription drugs.  
We will examine how DTCA affects physician prescribing patterns and courses of care 
for patients suffering from a representative chronic condition, osteoarthritis (OA).  This 
condition is of special significance, as one of the major products in this area, Merck’s “Vioxx” 
Cyclooxygenase-2 (Cox-2) inhibitor, was forced to withdraw from the market in October of 2004 
due to side effects on patients with heart conditions.  The side effects of Vioxx have caused 
considerable criticism of Merck’s advertising strategy for Vioxx.  (See, for example, editorials 
from New England Journal of Medicine. (D. Mukherjee et al., 2001, E. Topol, 2004))   
The primary goal of this paper is to determine what effect local and national television 
advertising on behalf of the two main COX-2 inhibitors had on the treatment decisions that 
patients made in collaboration with their physicians.  In particular, we will examine the impact of 
DTCA on the time to wait after diagnosis before initiating treatment with a COX-2 inhibitors 
available..  The paper will proceed by first reviewing the literature on DTCA in Section 2.  
Section 3 will present a theoretical model of optimal delay to treatment, Section 4 will present  
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details of the data and empirical model we implement.  Empirical results are presented in Section 
5, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion about future research. 
 
2. Background and Literature 
 
Advertising for Cox-2 Inhibitors 
 
Historically, pharmaceutical advertising was done largely through "detailing"  - 
promotion directly from the manufacturer to the physician, either through visits by 
representatives, contacts by pharmacists, or through advertisements in professional journals.   
Since the mid-1980s, however, drug companies in the U.S. have increasingly turned their 
marketing strategies directly towards the consumer. This advertising largely takes place through 
television media and in newspapers. This change in advertising approach has its share of both 
critics and advocates. 
The pharmaceutical industry in the U.S. is large – accounting for over $132 billion in 
retail sales in 2000 alone (Management NIFHC, 2001). In 2000, Celebrex (celeCoxib), the 
leading COX-2 inhibitor, had sales of approximately $2.6 billion (2001a)  - while Vioxx 
(rofeCoxib) sold over $1.2 billion in the first half of 2000 (Knight-Ridder News, 2001).  In 
support of Vioxx, Merck spent almost $161 million in direct to consumer advertising in 2000 
(M. Schumann, 2001)  – which was the most spent on DTCA for any prescription 
pharmaceutical, making it the 39th most advertised brand of any kind in 2000 (2001b). Over the 
same time periods, Pharmacia and Pfizer jointly spent $78 million in DTCA supporting 
Celebrex. 
We have chosen to examine the role of DTCA in the context of the market for COX-2 
inhibitors.  During the period spanned by our data (1999-2002), the two available COX-2 
inhibitors were Vioxx and Celebrex.  These drugs are appropriate subjects of study for a number 
of reasons.  First, they have been heavily advertised.  Second, they are significantly more 
expensive than alternative pharmacologic treatments for chronic pain.  Third, recent 
developments have indicated that these products may carry a significant risk of adverse cardiac 
side effects.  Consequently, many physicians have begun to question the wisdom in their use (E. 
Topol, 2004).  Additionally, given the widespread suspicion of advertising for prescription drugs,  
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clinicians and policy makers have questioned whether DTCA might be costing lives.  Our results 
will speak directly to this issue, in that if DTCA is having a deleterious effect (in terms of 
matching high risk patients to COX-2 use) then we will get one sign pattern on interaction terms 
between advertising and patient comorbidities. If, however, DTCA is having a positive effect (by 
matching patients most suited for COX-2 inhibitors with that therapy) then we will get the 
opposite sign pattern on the advertising /comorbidity interaction terms.  
For this study we have acquired data on television advertising for both Celebrex and 
Vioxx at the national (network) level, and for the top 75 local media markets in the U.S.  This 
data is aggregated to the monthly level.  Celebrex was approved by the FDA in December of 
1998 and Vioxx was approved in May of 1999. Thus at least one of the products was available 
for use over the 1999-2002 time period of our analysise.   Figure 1 presents the 2000 - 2002 
trends for the spending on national television advertising for Vioxx and Celebrex taken from our 
advertising data base (described below in Section 3).  
 
Literature on the Impact of DTCA 
 
In economic terms, we would expect advertising for prescription drugs to have three 
possible effects.  First, advertisement for a particular prescription product will provide 
information regarding the symptoms and regarding the fact that effective treatments are available 
about the medical condition that the drug treats.  This may be labeled a “public good” effect, as 
the information is available to consumers whether or not they purchase the particular product..  
Second, advertisement may provide important information regarding side effects, contra-
indications and the like, that may prompt patients to consult with their physician regarding a 
treatment modality.  This component of the advertising may be labeled as a “matching” effect, 
since it would assist patients and physicians in matching treatment regimes.  Third, advertising 
may simply lead patients to demand a product because of the aesthetic or persuasive 
characteristics of the ad, or the reputational impact of the ad, rather than the efficacy of the drug.  
This effect may be labeled as a “brand” effect.  Since health care markets, including 
pharmaceuticals, are often characterized by moral hazard, the welfare implications of this third 
effect are uncertain.  
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The studies on the impact of advertising in the prescription pharmaceutical market that 
have been published to date have yielded conflicting results.  There is an arm of this literature 
that is generally supportive of advertising in this market, such as  work by Telser and Leffler (K. 
Leffler, 1981, L. Telser, 1975).  Keith  finds that patient suggestions regarding pharmaceuticals 
(aspirin for cardiovascular disease) are important determinants in prescription decisions, and that 
advertising tends to lead to more appropriate care as a consequence (A. Keith, 1995).  In this, 
Keith is advancing an argument made earlier by Masson and Rubin which posits several 
mechanisms that could lead to positive impacts from advertising on the efficiency of the 
pharmaceutical market (including that it might encourage people to associate symptoms with a 
disease and seek care, or that it might alert people to treatments they were previously unaware of, 
which would encourage them to seek care) (A. Masson and P. Rubin, 1985).  For a survey of the 
more optimistic literature in this area, see Rubin  and Kleit (Andrew N. Kleit, 1998, P. Rubin, 
1991). 
  Not all economists, however, are so sanguine about the prospects of positive welfare 
effects from prescription pharmaceutical advertising.  Hurwitz and Caves find that – on net – 
promotional activities by pharmaceutical firms tend to have the effect of preserving market share 
for existing products and slowing the penetration of new compounds in the market. (M. Hurwitz 
and R. Caves, 1988)  King uses monthly sales data in the ulcer drug market to test the effect that 
marketing efforts have on the industry (C. King, 1996).  He finds that marketing by a firm causes 
the demand for the firm’s own products to become more inelastic, and tends to hamper product 
diversification.  Similarly, Rizzo, finds that direct to consumer advertising significantly reduced 
price elasticity in the market (J. Rizzo, 1999).  A reduction in price elasticity would increase 
opportunities for supra-competitive pricing.   
The post-1997 era has presented an opportunity for examination of the new policy regime 
for DTCA, and much of the literature has been focused on the FDA policy shift.  As Zachry and 
Ginsburg, point out, however, there is a paucity of studies that examine the actual impacts of 
DTCA (W. Zachry and D. Ginsburg, 2001).   
In one of the few such studies, DuBois examines the impact of DTCA through the lens of 
variation in procedure and drug use (R. Dubois, 2003).  He notes previous evidence that there is 
a wide geographic variety in the use of various medications, and suggests such variations imply 
underserved population.  DuBois cited several sources that indicate that geographic variations in  
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prescriptions have declined since the relaxation of DTCA regulations, perhaps implying that 
DTCA is conveying important medication information to previously underserved populations.  
Calfee, Winston, and Stempinski study whether the August 1997 policy changes at FDA 
increased the demand for the statin class of drugs, using monthly data from IMSHealth and 
Scott-Levin for a 58 month period. (J. Calfee et al., 2002). The authors, however, are unable to 
find significant short run direct effects.  They found that advertising did not have a statistically 
significant impact on aggregate prescriptions filled.  According to the authors, “it may only be 
possible to detect the effect of DTC advertising on consumer demand with disaggregated data 
that link’s a patient’s cholesterol treatment history with the timing of DTC expenditures.”  In a 
second test, Calfee et. al. attempt to determine if advertising cause patients to visit their doctor 
for a check-up.  Once again, advertising is found to be statistically insignificant.    Finally, they 
found some evidence that television ads aided adherence, which in turn improved success, which 
in turn increased demand.  
There also are a variety of studies that examine DTCA through the lens of survey data.  
For example, using a Scott-Levin data set, Gonul, Carter, and Winder examine the sentiments of 
both patients and physicians toward DTCA (F. Gonul et al., 2000).  They find that patients with 
chronic needs, and parents of children with health needs, are positively disposed toward DTCA, 
while older patients are relatively more trusting of physicians.  They also found that more 
experienced physicians, physicians with larger caseloads, and physicians with more exposure to 
DTCA are likely to be supportive of such advertising. Sumpradit et al. conducted a study in 1998 
of 1102 consumers with respect to DTCA (N. Sumpradit et al., 2002). Being afflicted with 
chronic conditions was found to be associated with the consumers' willingness to talk with 
doctors about the advertised drugs. Sumpradit et al. also found that consumers who asked for 
prescriptions tended to agree that DTCA made prescription drugs appear harmless and helped 
them make their own decision.  In a later study, however, Zachry, Dalen and Jackson found that 
physicians are more likely to become irritated from patient queries originating from DTCA 
rather than other sources of information (W. Zachry et al., 2003). 
Weissman et. al conducted a national telephone survey of 3000 adults in 2002 concerning 
the effects of DTCA (J. Weissman et al., 2003).  The authors assert that their results indicate 
positive findings for DTCA, along the lines of Masson and Rubin (A. Masson and P. Rubin, 
1985), as they find some evidence DTCA drew ill patients into their physicians’ offices, and  
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there was no evidence of drugs being improperly prescribed.   Weissman et. al  followed up this 
study with a survey of physicians published the following year (J. Weissman and et al, 2004).  In 
that study, they found that physician attitudes toward DTCA are mixed. 
Several authors published editorials responding to the Weissman et al. and Dubois 
papers.  Bodenheimer, Gahart et al., and Avorn all expressed skepticism that DTCA can be relied 
upon to support the beneficial welfare effects that are claimed in the primary research cited 
above (J. Avorn, 2003, T. Bodenhemier, 2003, M. Gahart et al., 2003).  Calfee  on the other 
hand, was more supportive of the positive findings of Weissman et al. and DuBois (John Calfee, 
2003).  Calfee founds the work persuasive due to its emphasis on the informational content of 
any advertisement and notes that the results of those two studies are quite consistent with the 
research on advertising in general in the economics literature.   
 
3. Theoretical Model 
 
Consider a patient who has been diagnosed with some chronic disease.  Upon diagnosis, 
the patient faces a choice – either initiate or delay treatment.  The benefits of treatment are 
potential improvements in symptoms of the underlying disease.  The costs are monetary (the 
treatment generally must be purchased at some positive market price) and potentially psychic 
(people often resist taking medication).  In order to decide whether to initiate treatment, the 
patient will evaluate her utility with treatment and her utility without treatment, and pick 
whichever path yields the highest expected value.  If the instantaneous utility associated with 
therapy is not higher than the utility associated with no therapy, then the patient will choose to 
delay.  Each period thereafter, the patient will undertake the same utility calculus, to determine 
whether to begin therapy or continue to wait.   
This model is similar in form to real option theories that have been applied to financial 
instruments (see for example, Merton (Robert C. Merton, 1973), and McDonald and Siegel (R. 
McDonald and D. Siegel, 1986)), to the timing of land development (see for example, Arnott and 
Lewis (R. Arnott and F. Lewis, 1979), Titman (S. Titman, 1985), Capozza and Li (D. Capozza 
and Y. Li, 2002), and Capozza and Li (D. Capozza and Y. Li, 1994)), and even to the timing of 
initial public offerings (see for example, Benninga, Hemantel, and Sarig (S. Benninga et al., 
2005)).  An interior optimum for the delay to an action can exist when there is a cost to  
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undertaking some action and when the benefits from the action increase over time.  Investment 
decisions may be irreversible (as in the case of land development) or reversible (as in the case of 
financial investment).   
We will motivate our empirical research by exploring a simple model of the timing of 
treatment for a stylized chronic disease.  Consider a patient who has been diagnosed with a 
condition which reduces her health.  Further, assume that the impact on health is cumulative – 
delaying treatment implies that the health state continues to decay.  The progression of the 
disease can be countered by pharmacological therapy. (Assume for the sake of simplicity that 
there is only one viable therapeutic option.)  The value of that therapy is unknown, but the 
patient has expectations about the treatment effect – expectations which can be affected by 
information, such as physician advice, testimonials from friends, or direct to consumer 
advertising.    Thus, the patient’s instantaneous health is: 
 
treatment with a t H









where, H is the base level of health at disease onset, δ is the impact of the disease on health 
during each time period, t represents time, and θ(.) is the expectations around the pharmacologic 
treatment effect, which can be affected by advertising, a.  Further, θa > 0, and θaa < 0. 
Utility is defined across consumption of some numeraire good, xt, and health, ht.  
Consumers may consume one unit of pharmaceutical treatment per period, at price P, or may 
continue to delay therapy.  Once a person chooses to initiate therapy, she will continue to receive 
treatment until their death at time T.  (Given the degenerative nature of the disease assumed in 
this model, once it becomes optimal to purchase treatment, it will necessarily be optimal in every 
time period after that.) 
Consequently, each patient will maximize the present value of lifetime utility by selecting 
the optimal delay for treatment onset according to: 
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where U( . ) is patient utility defined across income (I) and health. The optimal delay to onset, d
* 
is defined by taking the first partial of (1) with respect to d, and setting it equal to zero: 
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The usual convexity assumptions require that the second partial of (1) with respect to d 
be negative, or: 
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Given these assumptions, the optimal time to treatment exists, d
* = d
*(I, H, δ, r, a).  Note, of 
course, that one condition for an interior solution is that at time=0 the value of utility without 
therapy must be greater than the value of utility with therapy,.  That is, if U(I-P, H-δt+θ(a)) >  
U(I, H-δt) ∀ t, then the patient will choose to initiate therapy immediately, and d
* = 0.  Similarly, 
if U(I-P, H- δ t+θ(a)) <  U(I, H- δ t) ∀ t then the patient will never initiate therapy.   
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Since diminishing returns in health imply that the higher levels of health resulting from treatment 
reduces the marginal utility of health, and the complementarily between income and health will 
imply further reductions in Uh with the lower net income resulting from the requirement that 
some portion of any consumed therapy is paid out of pocket.  
Comparative static analysis of the impact of advertising on the optimally selected delay 
of treatment is straightforward.  Inserting the optimal delay time functional, d
*( . ) into (2), and 






















































The sign of this effect depends upon the sign of θa.  If a patient believes himself to be a good 
candidate for the treatment, then greater exposure to advertising, or other positive information 
about the efficacy of the treatment, will reduce the optimally chosen delay to therapy initiation.    
However, if the advertising conveys information that leads the patient to believe that he is a poor 
candidate for the treatment – by emphasizing adverse event or highlighting a contraindication 
from which the patient suffers – then the expected treatment effect will be reduced which will 
lengthen the optimal delay.  Thus, whether the information contained in the ad is “positive” or 
“negative” will depend upon patient expectations, other diagnoses, and preferences across the 
characteristics space of the therapy. 
There are several implications from the theoretical model for the empirical estimation.  
First, patients select the optimal delay from diagnosis to therapy.  Thus, we will calculate below 
this delay for each person in the data by estimating a parametric duration model.  For some 
patients it will be optimal to delay longer than we observe them, though for some it will be 
optimal to delay indefinitely.   Given that we only have data spanning the 1999 to 2002 time 
period, these two populations will be observationally equivalent – requiring that we take right-
hand censoring into account.  Since pharmacological treatments are better suited to some patients 
than others, the optimal delay will be a function of the patient’s other clinical diagnoses.  Finally, 
the model implies that this optimal delay will be a function of income, health state, opportunity 
cost of treatment, and advertising exposure – measured at the point of therapy initiation.  We will 
employ either direct measures or proxy measures for each of these factors. 
 






  To test the theoretical model discussed above, we will need to model the decision 
regarding how long to delay the onset of therapy with COX-2 inhibitors after a patient is 
diagnosed with osteoarthritis.  Before specifying an empirical implementation, several issues 
should be noted.  First, the decision we will model is one which is joint between the patient and 
physician.  In order to initiate treatment with some prescription drug, the patient must first 
choose to seek a physician visit, and in general must also be willing to pay in at least some part 
for the drug. We note that it is not uncommon for a patient to receive a prescription by calling 
into the physician practice, rather than actually seeking, and paying for, an office visit.   
However, to be given a long-term prescription for a COX-2 inhibitor generally requires a 
diagnosis of some chronic condition – and such a diagnosis will require an office visit. 
(Payments for both the office visit and pharmaceutical will depend upon the terms of the 
patients’ insurance coverage.) In addition to patient willingness to pay for a physician visit and 
for the drug in question, the physician must also see sufficient clinical merit to the treatment as to 
be willing to write the prescription.  Therefore, the decision to initiate therapy is a joint decision 
that is affected by both patient and physician factors.  Thus, our questions will be “what impact 
does DCA have on the likelihood that the physician/patient interaction will result in a 
prescription?” 
  Consequently, we seek to model the length of the spell between diagnosis and initiation 
of COX-2 inhibitor therapy.  There is a long econometric literature on duration modeling, which 
presents us with various modeling options.  Options range from non-parametric methods which 
impose few distributional restrictions to parametric methods where the distribution of the “time 
to failure” (to use the language of much of the literature) must be explicitly assumed.  All 
versions of the model are based upon estimating the hazard function, or the likelihood that a 
transition (in our case, between non-use of COX-2 inhibitors and use of COX-2 inhibitors) 
between states at time ∆t, conditional on the spell (of non-use) having persisted to time t.  One 
common specification for this hazard rate is to assume it is the product of some baseline 
population average hazard and an individual specific term (which may, or may not, depend upon 
covariates).   
The problem with this proportional hazard model is that it requires the population 
average effect to be constant over time.  A more flexible approach for duration models is 
presented in  Kalbfleisch and Prentis (J. Kalbfleisch and R. Prentice, 1981) and by Ridder (G.  
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Ridder, 1990), and known as Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models.  These models permit the 
baseline hazard to increase, decrease, or remain constant over time.  Figure 2 below presents the 
empirical hazards for the delay to treatment data we explore.  The instantaneous failure rates are 
not constant for our data as the proportional hazard assumption is strongly rejected for nearly all 
covariates in our models..  Consequently, we will estimate an AFT version of a duration model.  
In addition, the decreasing hazard we observe is consistent with a Weibull distribution – which is 
the distribution we will assume. 
  In addition to non-constancy in the baseline hazard, we have one other characteristic of 
the data to accommodate in our model choice.  Patients may exit their delay spell in one of two 
ways: by choosing Vioxx as the treatment to initiate, or by choosing Celebrex.  These exit 
strategies are not likely to be random, and may consequently affect the length of time that the 
delay spell itself lasts.  Thus, we are faced with the possibility of underling heterogeneity in the 
duration data, which arises due to unobservable characteristics of the patient.  Competing risk 
versions of the AFT model can account for this data generating process. For applications of the 
competing risk models in health care, see: (B.H. Hamilton and V. Hamilton, 1997)  (D. Cutler, 
1995) and (G. Picone et al., 2003).  These models are based on the generalized method of 
Heckman and Singer (J. Heckman and B. Singer, 1984), which model heterogeneous transition 
frailty as a multiplicative term with a gamma distribution. 
  Thus, we will model the delay to COX-2 initiation as an AFT hazard function with 
heterogeneous failures in a competing risk model where the instantaneous hazard follows a 
Weibull distribution, and the unobservable heterogeneity is modeled as a gamma distribution.  
The hazard rate is, then: 
























where xi are individual patient and practice characteristics, t is the duration of the individual 
delay spell, and αj capture the group-level heterogeneity in exit (to Vioxx or Celebrex). This is 






For this study we have acquired data on television advertising for both Celebrex and 
Vioxx at the national (network) level, and for the top 75 local media markets in the U.S.  This 
data is aggregated to the monthly level. Figure 1 presents the 2000 - 2002 trend for the dollars 
spent on national television advertising for Vioxx and Celebrex taken from our advertising data 
base. 
  As Figure 1 indicates, at the national level, monthly advertising exposure for the two 
brands is roughly comparable over the entire 2000-2002 time period.  However, a very different 
picture emerges at the local level, as presented in Figure 4, where television advertising spots for 
Celebrex are always greater than that of Vioxx for the entire period.  The value of ads purchased 
at the local level is much lower in dollar terms than at the national level.   
Since patients do not generally distinguish between the payment source of a television ad 
(whether the local station or national network receives the revenue), we will include measures of 
the total spending on television advertising our in our empirical models.  Consequently, we will 




Physician Micro Systems, Inc.
® (Seattle, WA) has marketed a commercial electronic 
medical record (i.e. Practice Partner) to physician practices for more than a decade.    This 
product is intended to replace paper charts, and has been widely adopted - largely by practices 
that are community based - for clinical reasons, and not for research purposes (nor because the 
practice has any affiliation with a research group or institution).  The Medical University of 
South Carolina (MUSC) collaborates with the vendor to gain access to the record extracts of 
practices that were willing to have their data used for research purposes.  This led to the 
development of a geographically diverse national research network of ambulatory, mostly 
primary care practices that use this single electronic medical record system (known as PPRNet).  
We will examine data on practices from 1999 through 2002.  As of 2002 (the end of the study 
period), 72 practices in 25 states, with 348 physicians, are or have been network members (see 
map below). 
Each quarter, participating practices run a computer program, developed and maintained 
by the electronic medical record vendor, to extract patient activity of the previous quarter from  
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the electronic medical record system.  This data is taken from the patient’s medical record – and 
so is similar to chart abstraction. The data capture all diagnoses, medications, patient 
characteristics (weight, blood pressure, etc), lab tests ordered, and lab results.  Currently, the 
entire research network database has information on 604,111 patients, including 3.6 million 
patient contacts, 3.8 million prescription records, 10.1 million vital signs, 12 million laboratory 
records, and 1.3 million preventive services records.  We extract a sub-set of this data on 22,011 
patients who had ever been diagnosed with osteoarthritis, and who physician had visits in the 
years 1999-2002.  (The time period of analysis is dictated by the availability of advertising data, 




The dependant variables for the models are the length of time each patient waits before 
initiating therapy with one of the two Cox-2 inhibitors after being diagnosed with osteoarthritis.   
This is calculated as the difference (in days) between the diagnosis date for osteoarthritis 
(recorded in the clinical data) and the prescribing date for the first instance of a Vioxx or 
Celebrex prescription.  However, COX-2 inhibitors are used for many complaints in addition to 
osteoarthritis; additionally, patients may use a COX-2 for occasional arthritis pain, even before a 
formal diagnosis is made.  In these cases, the “delay” would be negative.  For such negative 
delays, the duration between diagnosis and the prescription is set to one day.  In addition, most of 
the patients with a diagnosis of osteoarthritis do not receive a prescription for Vioxx or Celebrex 
as long as they are observed in the data.  Thus, the duration models we estimate will control for 
this right censoring. 
The independent variables fall into several categories, such advertising information, 
patient individual clinical information, and market/practice characteristics. 
We obtained national and local advertising information from Competitive Media 
Reporting, Inc. (CMR), which collects data on media advertising for all products, including 
pharmaceuticals, at the market (e.g., city) level.  The data is specific to the brand name of the 
product.  Consequently, it is possible to determine which products were advertised, which month 
they were advertised, how many times they were advertised, and how many dollars were spent 
on the ads.  Patients and physician practices were assigned to the nearest media markets  
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separately by two of the authors.  When a practice was close to multiple media markets, they 
were assigned to the one which was nearest (by driving miles).  In addition, we excluded all 
practices which are unusually far from the nearest media market (more than 100 straight-line 
miles), in order to avoid any bias from mis-matching of practice and media market.     
We measure advertising exposure as the total (national and local) dollars spent on ads 
broadcast for each brand advertised.  We add the separate measures for national advertising and 
local advertising into a single total monthly spending variable.  While it is the case that local ads 
tend to be shown during different times of the day and during different programming (e.g., local 
ads may be more heavily placed in daytime or late night programming, where national ads may 
be placed more frequently during national news broadcasts and prime-time), it is unclear that this 
difference matters empirically.  We have estimated versions of out models with the national and 
local ad spending included separately, and the net results are not meaningfully different.     
Additionally, since the theoretical model suggests that patient characteristics at the time 
of the switch are the important factors in initiating therapy, and since we have not captured 
precisely when in the month therapy begins, we will measure potential advertising exposure as 
the dollars spent in the month preceding the initiation of therapy.   
The patient data contains limited demographic and detailed clinical information.  For 
patient demographic information, we include patient age and an indicator variable for whether 
the patient is female.  We also include variables that capture whether the patient has ever been 
diagnosed with (or treated for) other relevant comorbidities.  These include indicator variables 
for if the patient has ever been diagnosed with heart disease (coronary disease or hypertension), 
depression, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, or ever treated for gastrointestinal difficulties with proton-
pump inhibitors, H2 blockers, or related products. 
Imputations of additional descriptive variables can be made secondary sources.  We 
imputed the price of an intermediate length physician’s office visit with an established patient 
from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association’s (ACCRA) Quarterly Price 
Reports.  These quarterly reports contain average prices for 50 commodities (including physician 
office visits) for around 300 metropolitan areas.  The linking between average physician visit 
price and the patient was accomplished by using the average price in the metropolitan area 
nearest the primary care practice site.  Average county per capita income, the percent of the 
county population covered by Medicare, the percent of the county employed in the labor force,  
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the percent of the county population that is Caucasian and African-American, the county 
population, and the number of physicians per 10,000 population were also merged onto the data 
from the Area Resource File.  Counties were identified as the county in which the practice is 
located.  This information is available on an annual basis. 
In addition to the impact of advertising, another source of information which may affect 
physician prescribing is medical journals.  The late 1990s and early 2000s was a period when a 
significant amount of research was being conducted on the efficacy and side effects of Cox-2 
inhibitors.  We will control for clinical knowledge in two ways.  First, over the period of our 
study (1999 – 2002) there were over 900 publications in English-language medical journals 
about Cox-2 inhibitors.  Of those, 132 were specifically in the area of osteoarthritis.  In order to 
control for the effect of this research on clinical providers, we created a data series which 
measures the number of publications in each month that had the keywords: rofeCoxib, 
celeCoxib, Vioxx, Celebrex, and osteoarthritis.  We further refined the measure by dividing it 
into three series: the number of publications each month that focused on Celebrex, the number of 
publications each month that focused on Vioxx, and the number of publications each month that 
focused on both.  
Second, in August of 2001, Mukherjee, Nissen, and Topol published an influential article 
in a major medical journal, where they reviewed data available from a major clinical trial which 
indicated serious statistically significant concerns about the cardiovascular risk associated with 
Vioxx (rofeCoxib). To a lesser, and not statistically significant, extent the paper raised concerns 
about Celebrex (celeCoxib) (D. Mukherjee, S. Nissen and E. Topol, 2001, hereafter abbreivated 
MNT).  This was the first publication in a major outlet to raise issues about increased risk of 
myocardial infarction associated with Cox-2 inhibitors in general, and Vioxx in particular.   
These concerns were later to be validated when Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in 
October of 2004.  We will include an indicator variable which equals 1 after August 2001, and  0 
otherwise, to test whether the practicing clinical community responded to this new information, 







Possible Impacts of Advertising 
 
  There are several variables which are central to understanding the impact of advertising 
on patient treatment delay decisions.  The first set, obviously, are the measures of advertising 
spending on behalf of Vioxx and Celebrex.  In general, one would expect the impact of Vioxx or 
Celebrex brand television DCA to shorten the time that patients wait before initiating any COX-2 
inhibitor treatment – in which case the parameter on the advertising measures will be negative 
and significant.  It is possible that the only effect of advertising is class-level.  That is, it may not 
matter which drug is advertised – any advertising for a COX-2 inhibitor may affect the demand 
for both approximately equally.  To evaluate this, we will estimate two versions of the model.  
The first will include total dollars spent (as both a linear and squared term) in the previous month 
on both Celebrex and Vioxx as one variable.  The second will include separate measures (again, 
both linear and squared terms) for Celebrex and Vioxx ad spending.    If television advertising 
has a pure class effect, then advertisement for Vioxx and Celebrex would have roughly equal 
effects when entered individually on the delay to therapy for Celebrex (Vioxx) in the separate 
models we run for delay to initiation for each brand individually. 
  That advertising has an effect, however, says little about the social welfare impact of 
DCA.  We can, however, something about the welfare effects of advertising by examining its 
effect on delay to treatment for patients that are likely to benefit from, or be poor candidates for, 
COX-2 inhibitor use.  In particular, patients who have required treatment for gastrointestinal 
problems using proton-pump inhibitors, H2-blockers, or other similar treatments, are more likely 
to suffer gastric irritation from NSAIDs, and so are the good candidates for COX-2 inhibitors. In 
this case, we identified patients with gastrointestinal comorbidities as those who have ever had a 
prescription for ranitidine (e.g., Zantac), famotidine (e.g., Pepcid), cimetidine (e.g., Tagamet), 
omeprazole (e.g., Prilosec), esomeprazole (e.g., Nexium), lansoprazole (e.g., Previcid), 
rabeprazole (e.g., Aciphex), pantoprazole (e.g., Protonix), sulcralfate (e.g., Carafate), 
misoprostol (e.g., Cytotec), Helidac, Prevpac, or metoclopromide (e.g., Reglan).  Consequently, 
we interacted the advertising measures with the indicator variable for gastrointestinal problems.  
If advertising improves patient matching, then the parameters on those interactions will be 
negative and significant.  
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  In contrast, there are a number of conditions which make a person a poor candidate for 
use of a COX-2 inhibitor.  These include a diagnosis of heart disease (hypertension and other 
coronary diseases).  Individuals with these conditions should initiate therapy with a COX-2 
inhibitor less frequently, which translates into longer delay times.  However, this set of 
contraindications were not widely discussed in the clinical community until the publication of 
the MNT article in August of 2001,.  Consequently, we will test for the informational 
components of the DCA for heart disease by including a three-way interaction term between the 
advertising measures the heart disease indicator variable and the indicator variable for whether 
the treatment began after August 2001.  If the advertising is conveying clinically useful 
information, then the parameter on this interaction will be positive and significant (indicating 
that advertisement induces individuals with those comorbidities to wait longer to begin treatment 




  Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables used in our model, 
including the average delay to treatment (conditional on initiating therapy).  More information on 
the raw delay measures is presented in Table 2, which shows the average delay time between 
diagnosis and the first long-term use of each COX-2 inhibitor, as well as the number of people 
who ultimately adopt each.  We find that patients who first adopt Celebrex tend to adopt more 
rapidly than those who first adopt Vioxx, with a delay of 163 days for the Celebrex users, 
compared to a delay of 199 days for the Vioxx users.  Interestingly, for all of the attention paid to 
the introduction of COX-2 inhibitors, and the large expenditures on promotion on their behalf, 
64% of the sample (11,741 patients) did not adopt one of the COX-2 inhibitors. 
  We estimate two versions of the hazard function presented in Equation (6).  Model 1 
contains the advertising measures (as combined national and local dollars spent) for Vioxx and 
Celebrex together, along with the set of independent variables listed above.  Model 2 includes 
separate measures for total Vioxx and Celebrex monthly advertsing, along with the other 
independent variables.  Thus we will estimate the hazard rate in (6) above, where: 
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
Z CVD GI TNM TV CVD
TNM TV CVD TV GI TV TV x
ε β β β β
β β β β β
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅









and where TV is either the combined Voixx and Celebrex national and local advertising dollars, 
or brand-specific national and local advertising dollars, GI is the indicator for a gastrointestinal 
comorbidity, CVD is the indicator for heart disease comorbidities (cardiovascular disease and 
hypertension), TMN is the indicator variable for the post-August 2001 period (which corresponds 
to the publication of the Topol, Nissan and Mukerjee article which first alerted the medical 
profession to the increased risk for heart attack associated with the use of some COX-2 
inhibitors), and Z represents the remainder of the explanatory variables discussed above.  The 
coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3. 
  In the first model, where the COX-2 television advertising dollars for both brands are 
summed together, we find that television advertising does have a significant effect on the delay 
in treatment.  Total television spending has a positive first derivative and negative second 
derivative – both significant at better than the 1% level.  The parameter estimates in Table 3 are 
not direct measures of the net effect in terms of days of delay.  Table 4 presents these net effects 
for the variables of primary interest, and converts the raw effects to days of delay induced by a 
one unit increase in the variable of interest.  For total (Vioxx plus Celebrex) television spending, 
we find that a $100,000 increase in all COX-2 advertising has the effect of lengthening the time 
patients wait to begin COX-2 therapy after being diagnosed with osteoarthritis by about 30 days.  
Note that this in addition to average delay periods of between 160 and 200 days delay (Table 2). 
  The second model in Table 3 breaks television advertising spending into separate 
measures for total monthly spending on behalf of Vioxx and total monthly spending on behalf of 
Celebrex.  We find that the results are similar – in that spending on behalf of both brands tends to 
increase the delay initially, and then lead to a decrease – again, with statistical significance in 
excess of the 1% level.  There is, however, a significant difference in terms of where on this 
quadratic function the two brands are placed.   
In the case of Vioxx, the relationship between total spending an delay of therapy becomes 
negative at $2.4 million per month.  During the time period of our data, Merck spent 
approximately $3.5 million per month on behalf of Vioxx; thus, the marginal dollar spent for 
Vioxx advertising lead to a reduction in the average delay before initiating any COX-2 therapy 
of approximately 14 days (Table 4)).  In contrast, the relationship between spending for Celebrex 
and the delay to therapy adoption does not become negative until Pfizer would spend more than 
$34.5 million per month.  During 1999-2002, Pfizer spent $6.5 million per month on average –  
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and never more than $13.8 million per month.  This implies thta the marginal dollar spent for 
Celebrex by Pfizer actually lengthens the delay in initiating any COX-2 treatment by 
approximately 41 days (Table 4).  Thus, the positive effect of joint advertising spending on delay 
to adoption in the first model is driven completely by Celebrex ads. This curious reverse 
association between Celebrex television advertising and the use of Celebrex is consistent with 
other recent research we have conducted which examined the associate between television 
advertising and the rate of prescribing for Vioxx and Celebrex at the physician practice level 
(W.D. Bradford et al., 2005)
1. 
  Given that we find that television advertising on behalf of the COX-2 inhibitors has some 
effect on the delay to use, the next question to address is whether this effect is welfare enhancing 
or not.  As discussed above, some patients are better candidates for COX-2 use, in that they have 
exhibited the sorts of gastrointestinal sensitivities for which Vioxx and Celebrex were designed.  
Other patients have hypertension and coronary disease comorbidities which make them poor 
candidates for using COX-2 inhibitors, since these conditions have been recognized as 
contraindications for COX-2 use since the publication of the TNM article. As discussed above, 
we estimate models with interactions between total television advertising (local and national) and 
the GI indicator variable, the heart disease and pre-TNM   indicators, and the heart disease and 
post-TNM  indicators. 
  Table 3 presents the relevant parameters.  We find strong evidence for welfare-enhancing 
informational effects.  The interaction between total COX-2 inhibitor advertising and the 
indicator variable for gastrointestinal sensitivity is negative and highly significant in both 
models.  In terms of the magnitude of the effect, patients with GI comorbidities reduce their wait 
time to adopt COX-2 inhibitor treatment by between 2 and 2.4 days for every additional 
$100,000 in monthly COX-2 inhibitor advertising (Table 4).   
The effect of advertising on patients with heart disease comorbidities (cardiovascular 
disease and hypertension) depends upon whether we observe the therapy being initiated prior to 
the publication of TNM or after.  Prior to TNM, patients with cardiovascular comorbidities 
                                                 
1 We also estimated versions of the duration of delay for Vioxx and Celebrex separately, including spending on both 
brands in each equation.  In those models we found that the general effects demonstrated in the second column of 
Table 3 hold: Vioxx spending generally has a net effect of reducing the delay to therapy adoption for both Vioxx 
and Celebrex, while Celebrex has a net effect of lengthening the delay for both brands.  Those results are available 




actually adopted COX-2 inhibitor therapy more rapidly when exposed to increased advertising.  
Given the information about the potential cardiac dangers associated with COX-2 inhibitor use 
(especially Vioxx), this is contrary to what would improve social welfare.  However, prior to the 
publication of the TNM paper, this risk was poorly appreciated in the clinical community.   
However, once the TNM paper was published, we find a strong positive impact on delay to 
therapy initiation for patients with diagnosed heart disease when exposed to greater levels of 
COX-2 inhibitor advertising.  This is the direction one would expect if the ads provide real 
information that assists patients and physicians to more optimally match therapies.  In fact, the 
post-TNM interaction effect is larger than the pre-TNM interaction effect by approximately 6 – 8 
days.
2   
Recall that we proposed relatively strong tests of whether DCA for COX-2 inhibitors lead 
to welfare enhancing or reducing effects.  If increasing DCA is associated with reductions in the 
time patients who are good candidates for the therapy wait before initiating treatment and is 
associated with increases in the time patients who are poor candidates wait before initiating 
treatment, then the advertising must be providing useful information to the clinical matching 
process.  In this case, DCA has at least some welfare enhancing characteristics.  We find exactly 
this pattern in our interactions between patients with previously treated GI difficulties (good 
candidates) and with previously diagnosed heart disease (poor candidates).  In addition, the 
expected positive effect from the heart disease only shows up after the first important clinical 
publication to demonstrate that patients with heart disease are, in fact, at increased risk from 
COX-2 inhibitor use.  Taken together, this evidence strongly supports the neoclassical view of 
advertising as information – and throws the strong criticism that pharmaceutical DCA has 
recently received into question. 
  Finally, Table 3 presents parameters which test whether patients and clinicians respond to 
information from the clinical literature.  As discussed above, we included measures of gross 
publication rates in the month preceding initiation of COX-2 use for papers which discuss COX-
2 inhibitors (either generically, or focusing on a specific brand) in the context of care for patients 
with osteoarthritis.  While the measures of clinical publication rates are uniformly statistically 
significant, there is little consistency in the parameter values (except for publications involving 
                                                 
2 Note that while the absolute magnitudes of the pre- and post-TNM interaction effects are quite different 
between the two models, the net effects are quite similar.  
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only Celebrex – which tended to always increase delay times).  We take this as evidence that 
clinical publications are measurably important for the prescribing patterns of primary care 
clinician in community practice, we cannot characterize how the effect is felt.  This is likely 
because some publications are favorable toward the effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) of 
COX-2 inhibitors and some are pessimistic.  However, our data do not currently characterize the 
tenor of the publication.  More research on how clinical information and DCA information 
interact appears warranted.  Finally, the year indicators, local market characteristics, and patient 
demographic variables were generally significant (as were many of the physician practice fixed 




The increased use of television advertising by manufacturers of prescription 
pharmaceutical has been a controversial development over the last five to ten years in the United 
States.  While the use of such advertisement has grown dramatically since the early 1990s, to 
date there have been few studies which have empirically examined the effect of these ads on 
patient care.  The primary goal of this paper is to determine what effect local and national 
television advertising on behalf of the two main COX-2 inhibitors had on the treatment decisions 
that patients made in collaboration with their physicians.  In particular, the treatment decision we 
studied is the time patients choose to wait before initiating treatment with either Vioxx or 
Celebrex.  Using data on 18,235 patients from a set of geographically dispersed community-
based primary care practices, we have measured the determinants of the delay between diagnosis 
for osteoarthritis and onset of COX-2 inhibitor therapy.  To accomplish these goals, we estimated 
a series of competing risk duration regressions, using an Accelerated Failure Time model.   
We find that increases in television advertising for Vioxx is associated with shorter wait 
times between diagnosis and use.  On the other hand, national Celebrex television advertising is 
associated with longer delays to COX-2 adoption.  Finally, we also present evidence that the 
effect of DCA may tend to improve economic efficiency, in that advertising tends to shorten the 
delays to adoption for patients who are better candidates for COX-2 use, and lengthens the delay 
to adoption for patients who are worse candidates for the use of COX-2 inhibitors. 
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Percent of county population that is Caucasian
Percent of county population that is African-American
Average price for intermediate length phyisician visit
Number of physicians per 1000 population in county
County per capita income
Number of Medicare enrollees in county
Percent of county residents who are employed
Patient has been diagnosed with depression
Patient has been diagnosed with diabetes
Patient has been diagnosed with hyperlipidemia
County population
Therapy initiated in 2000
Therapy initiated in 2001
Patient age at therpay initiation
Patient is female
Number of journal publications discussing COX-2 inhibitors in 
month preceeding therapy
Number of journal publications discussing Vioxx in month 
preceeding therapy
Number of journal publications discussing Celebrex in month 
preceeding therapy
Therapy initiated in 1999
Patient has been diagnosed with heart disease
Interaction between gastrointestinal treatment and total COX-2 
inhibitor advertising dollars
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
advertising dollars during pre-TNMperiod
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
advertising dollars during post-TNMeriod
Total dollars in Vioxx advertising squared, month preceeding 
therapy (in $100,000s)
Total dollars in Celebrex advertising, month preceeding therapy 
(in $100,000s)
Total dollars in Celebrex advertising squared, month 
preceeding therapy (in $100,000s)
Patient has received gastrointestinal treatment
Table 1: Data Description
N = 18,235
Average delay between diagnosis with OA and first use of COX-
2 inhibitor (for 6494 uncensored observations)
Total dollars in COX-2 advertising squared, month preceeding 
therapy (in $100,000s)











Table 2: Delay Between OA Diagnosis and First COX-2 Use 
(Number of Patients) 
  Average delay for 
Patients who do not 
adopt Vioxx 
Average delay for 
patients who adopt 
Vioxx 
Average delay for 






Average delay for 















































































LR Test of Overall Signifcance 11957.97 13164.55
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001
Total dollars in COX-2 advertising, month preceeding therapy 
(in $100,000s)
Total dollars in COX-2 advertising squared, month preceeding 
therapy (in $100,000s)
Total dollars in Vioxx advertising, month preceeding therapy (in 
$100,000s)
Total dollars in Vioxx advertising squared, month preceeding 
therapy (in $100,000s)
Total dollars in Celebrex advertising, month preceeding therapy 
(in $100,000s)
Total dollars in Celebrex advertising squared, month 
preceeding therapy (in $100,000s)
Patient has received gastrointestinal treatment
Patient has been diagnosed with heart disease
Interaction between gastrointestinal treatment and total COX-2 
inhibitor advertising dollars
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
advertising dollars during pre-TNMperiod
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
advertising dollars during post-TNMeriod
Number of journal publications discussing COX-2 inhibitors in 
month preceeding therapy
Number of journal publications discussing Vioxx in month 
preceeding therapy
Number of journal publications discussing Celebrex in month 
preceeding therapy
Therapy initiated in 1999
Therapy initiated in 2000
County population (in 1000s)
Number of physicians per 1000 population in county
Therapy initiated in 2001
Patient age at therpay initiation
Patient is female
Patient has been diagnosed with depression
Percent of county population that is African-American
Average price for intermediate length phyisician visit
Constant




County per capita income
Number of Medicare enrollees in county
Percent of county residents who are employed
Percent of county population that is Caucasian
Patient has been diagnosed with diabetes












Separated Vioxx and 
Celebrex Total 
Advertising
Table 4: Accelerated Failure Time Duration Models of Time Between Diagnosis and Treatment for OA 
Patients
Net Marginal Effects: 
Change in Days of Delay to Treatment for a One Unit Change in the Explanatory Variable
Total dollars in COX-2 advertising, month preceeding therapy 
(in $100,000s)
30.7 -
Total dollars in Vioxx advertising, month preceeding therapy (in 
$100,000s)
-- 1 3 . 7
Total dollars in Celebrex advertising, month preceeding therapy 
(in $100,000s)
Interaction between gastrointestinal treatment and total COX-2 
inhibitor advertising dollars
-2.0 -2.4
-4 0 . 8
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
advertising dollars during pre-TNM period
-31.0 -2.8
Interaction between heart disease and total COX-2 inhibitor 
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